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It does not take much to realize that, concerning the topic of Iran, the lack of response and 
general confusion from the Left within liberal, Western democracies is deeply symptomatic. That 
the perplexed responses of liberals seem to be characterized by a fetishization of the Iranian 
Other, reducing them to an empty screen onto which the liberal ideological subject may project 
their fantasy, prevents the Left from acknowledging that Iranian ideology functions as an over-
identification with many of the excesses which liberal ideology is so used to criticizing. The 
present work seeks to traverse this fantasy space, explicating the way Iran is considered to the 
object-cause of liberal desire and the consequences this conception has for the Left’s capacity 
to coherently respond to the present situation as it unfolds.
To begin, it should be noted that while liberal Western ideology is a term inclusive of 
several approaches, all of which posses different quilting points, we will concern ourselves with 
the expression of liberal ideology in multiculturalism. Like all ideologies, those of the liberal 
democratic West are structured around a particular object of enjoyment which may be located 
by interrogating their particular responses to the Other, who, in this case, is Iranian. A 
consideration of how this Other is related to the ideological subject’s fantasy space should 
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expose the libidinal investment of Western ideology into the symbolic construction which they 
claim to compete against.
The multiculturalist response to the present situation in Iran is that the West has no 
place commenting on the Iranian condition, as any attempt to do so holds Iran to a Western 
standard. However, this attempt to establish an irreducible gap between one’s particular position 
and that of Iranians is ultimately synonymous with a sort of  
…patronizing Eurocentrist distance and/or respect for local cultures without 
roots in one’s own particular culture. In other words, multiculturalism is a 
disavowed, inverted, self-referential  form of racism, a ‘racism with a distance’ 
– it ‘respects’ the Other’s identity, conceiving of the Other as a self-enclosed 
‘authentic’ community towards which he, the multiculturalist, maintains a 
distance rendered possible by his privileged universal position. 
Multiculturalism is a racism which empties its own position of all positive 
content (the multiculturalist is not a direct racist, he doesn’t oppose to the 
Other the particular values of his own culture), but nonetheless retains this 
position as the privileged empty point of universality from which one is able to 
appreciate (and depreciate) properly other particular cultures – the 
multiculturalist respect for the Other’s specificity is the very form of asserting 
one’s superiority. (Žižek, 2006: 171) 
This multicultural assertion of distance ensures the liberal subject holds the position of the 
(empty) universal which is the only one capable of appreciating all cultures in their unique 
particularity, supposedly without asserting itself above and against them. This condescending 
refusal to apply any common standard of interpreting a given culture or society under the 
auspices of avoiding Eurocentricism secretly preserves a conception of the modern condition as 
unique to white, bourgeois males, while simultaneously insulating any and all acts of violence 
from judgment, culminating in their fetishization, as the ability to stomach the Other in their full 
radicality feeds into the self-righteous enjoyment derived from distancing oneself from particular 
cultural coordinates. 
Here it is difficult not to recall Foucault’s engagement with the Iranian revolution of 1979. 
The clearest expression of Foucault’s continual assertion of a gap between the West and 
Iranian ideology can be seen in his referral to Iran as operating under a “regime of truth” which 
is wholly different from ours. (Afary and Anderson, 2005: 259) Having established this distance, 
Foucault can safely advise us to “admit that we Westerners would be in a poor position to give 
advice to the Iranians.” (Ibid: 213) Ignoring the abuse of minorities in the 1979 revolution, 
Foucault instead characterized the revolt as spreading “without splits or internal conflicts.” 
(Bolstering this contention, prior to Foucault’s formal support of the Iranian revolution, when 
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Catherine von Bulow spoke of being ‘“flabbergasted’ by an Arab man who had told her to 
separate herself from the men at the demonstration… Foucault responded very forcefully. He 
shifted the issue from the treatment she had received to one of sympathy for a culture marked 
by an underlying homoeroticism.”  (Ibid: 211) This response makes the fetishization clear, 
whereby the irreducible distance asserted by the liberal subject functions simultaneously as a 
mechanism to defend the projection of their fantasy onto the foreign Other. Returning to 
Foucault’s defense of Iranian chauvinism, von Bulow recalled Foucault as excusing this 
behavior, remarking, “they live among men. As men, they are made for men, with the fleeting 
bedazzlement, the brief reward of women… Those fraternal cells were based on a subtle 
mixture of friendship and sensuality. And sexuality… had its place there.” (Ibid) This 
misunderstanding was at least partially due to Foucault’s fetishist overemphasis of particular 
Islamic cultural practices, such as the acceptability of “kissing, hugging, and holding hands 
between men and between women” as social customs. (Ibid: 162) Of course, it did not help 
matters that Foucault’s first visits Tunisia entailed an appreciation of sex tourism. (Macey, 1993: 
184-5) 
As Foucault would find out just two years later in an interview with Iranian journalist 
Ibrahim Nabavi, the reality of the situation was quite different, with many Iranians supporting the 
execution of homosexuals. (Afary and Anderson, 2005: 143) In fact, “soon after coming to 
power in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini established the death penalty for homosexuality. In February 
and March 1979 there were sixteen executions for crimes related to sexual violations.” (Ibid: 
162) That Foucault had interest in bondage, domination, sadism and masochism makes his 
enjoyment in other particular cultural rituals, such as youths publicly flagellating themselves, 
(Ibid: 47) as well as his appreciation for martyrdom (Ibid: 134) and suicide (Ibid: 34) as 
expressions of subjectivity, all the more interesting. 
The general point to be made with regard to Foucault, however, is that in his attempt to 
avoid committing the error of projecting Western standards onto Iran, even refusing 
considerations of minority rights, he nevertheless fetishized the Iranian revolution, falling prey to 
Orientalist logic up to the point of seeing in Iran “a place where one could look for sexual 
experience unattainable in Europe.” (Said, 1978: 190) For anyone familiar with Foucault’s work, 
especially with the second and third volumes of his History of Sexuality, it is clear that 
“Foucault’s ‘Orient’ seems to include the Greco-Roman world as well as the Eastern one, since 
the contrast he draws is primarily between tradition and modernity rather than East and West as 
such… In Foucault, a dualism emerges in which the pre-modern social order… is privileged 
over the modern Western one.” (Afary and Anderson, 2005: 18)
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Again, similar to the multiculturalist’s implicit claim that modernity is a condition unique to 
the white, bourgeois male, which is to say, similar to the multiculturalist’s refusal to hold any 
particular culture to a universal norm of judgment, 
…the image of Antiquity deployed in Foucault’s last two books is stricto sensu 
phantasmic, the fantasy of a discipline which, even in its most ascetic version, 
needs no reference to the symbolic Law/Prohibition of pleasures without 
sexuality. In his attempt to break out of the vicious cycle of power and resistance, 
Foucault resorts to the myth of a state ‘before the Fall’ in which discipline was 
self-fashioned, not a procedure imposed by the culpabilizing universal moral 
order. (Žižek, 1999: 251-2)
  
In response to this theoretical pitfall, one should acknowledge this temptation to believe in a pre-
modern order as “the necessary Romantic-naïve supplement to [Foucault’s] cynical description 
of power relations after the Fall, where power and resistance overlap.” (Ibid) In other words, 
Foucault’s point regarding the productive and animating effects of power causes us to conclude 
that 
…the very subject who resists these disciplinary measures and tries to elude 
their grasp is, in his heart of hearts, branded by them, formed by them. Foucault’s 
ultimate example would have been the nineteenth-century workers’ movement for 
the ‘liberation of work:’ As early libertarian criticisms… had already pointed out, 
the Worker who wanted himself liberated was the product of disciplinary ethics, 
that is, in his very attempt to get rid of the domination of Capital, he wanted to 
establish himself as the disciplined worker who works for himself, who is fully his 
own master (and thus loses the right to resist, since he cannot resist himself…). 
(Ibid)
With regard to Foucault and the liberal subject, this amounts to a recognition that the attempt 
access the enjoyment of the Other’s (particular) culture, as well as the enjoyment of asserting 
oneself as the (empty) universal, requires the liberal subject to erase their own particular identity 
and to refuse the Other’s ability to do so by blackmailing them with a particular remainder or 
stain which is fetishized.
Furthermore, this analysis holds true in the context of Islamic ideology insofar as 
particular political content is sacrificed in the attempt to identify with the (universal) Islamic 
movement. This was seen in the willingness of workers as well as women and other minorities 
to subordinate their interest to the empty signifier that is ‘Islamic government’ during the 
Khomeini revolution. That “there is no single hermeneutics of Islam as such” (Postel, 2006: 114) 
enables Iranian ideology to absorb a general malcontent, to the point of being “heralded as the 
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savior of the oppressed, the only state in the Middle East fighting colonialism, standing up to the 
United States and Israel.” (Baer, 2008: 40) Completing our juxtaposition, it is this same 
emptiness which also allows the regime to hold all individuals accountable for a particular 
remainder or stain which exposes their heretical and treacherous desire.
In both of these cases, that of the multiculturalist fearful of Eurocentricism and the 
nationalist fearful of foreign plots, there is a fixation on the Other as having access to a 
prohibited form of enjoyment, thereby marking a fantasy space. 
What we gain by transposing the perception of inherent social antagonisms into 
the fascination with the Other (Jew, Japanese, etc.) is the fantasy-organization of 
desire. The Lacanian thesis that enjoyment is ultimately always enjoyment of the 
Other, i.e. enjoyment supposed, imputed to the Other, and that, conversely, the 
hatred of the Other’s enjoyment is always the hatred of one’s own enjoyment, is 
perfectly exemplified by this logic of the “theft of enjoyment.” What are fantasies 
about the Other’s special, excessive enjoyment – about the black’s superior 
sexual potency and appetite, about the Jew’s or Japanese’s special relationship 
toward money and work – if not precisely so many ways, for us, to organize our 
own enjoyment? Do we not find enjoyment precisely in fantasizing about the 
Other’s enjoyment, in the ambivalent attitude toward it?  Do we not obtain 
satisfaction by means of the very supposition that the Other enjoys in a way 
inaccessible to us? Does not the Other’s enjoyment exert such a powerful 
fascination because in it we represent to ourselves our innermost relationship 
toward enjoyment? And, conversely, is the Anti-Semitic capitalist’s hatred toward 
the Jew not hatred of the excess that pertains to capitalism itself[?] (Žižek, 1993: 
206)
In our aforementioned examples, the logic of the “theft of enjoyment” can clearly be seen in the 
notion of the pre-modern Other still capable of directly and authentically relating to their closed 
community absent any sort of mediated self-consciousness, as well as in the notion of the 
imperialist foreign plots designed to upset the glorious destiny of the Persian empire, if not the 
destiny of all of Islam. The crucial thing to keep in mind here is that “the hatred of the Other’s 
enjoyment is always the hatred of one’s own enjoyment.” (Ibid) Or, to recapitulate, is not the 
multiculturalist attempt to purge the world of all traces of political incorrectness, unto the point of 
refusing to acknowledge universal standards of rights, an expression of the longing to return to 
an organic and enclosed community where one may be explicitly prejudiced? And what of 
Iranian ideology? Does not the continual purging of traitors convicted of foreign conspiracies 
express a longing for a legitimate voice in the international arena and a simultaneous hatred of 
Iran’s need to exert foreign influence only by proxy warfare as carried out by Hamas, Hezbollah 
and other Shia guerilla groups?
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This analysis can even be applied to the conservative ideology of the West. Does the 
anger inspired by Ahmadinejad’s referencing “inalienable nuclear rights” not come from the 
enjoyment of experiencing the possession of nuclear arms as inalienable? (Ahmadinejad 2009: 
unpaginated) The same can also be said of criticizing the terrorist or ‘proxy’ tactics of Iran. Is the 
anger directed toward such actions not an expression of the conservative desire to return to a 
pre-liberal space in which ‘anything goes,’ where Western states may engage in terrorist 
activities while claiming there is no (international) Law, or ‘rules of the game?’ And what to make 
of the newly developed consciousness of Western conservatives’ which suddenly inspires their 
hatred of women’s rights abuses in Iran?
Liberal ideology may certainly be well aware of these clumsy inconsistencies within 
conservative ideology. Indeed, it is largely due to Ahmadinejad’s ability to blackmail the Left with 
this conservative baggage that there is so little being said by the Left on the topic of Iran. 
Exemplary here is the question of how to respond to Ahmadinejad’s method of criticizing 
policies by comparing them to those of the Bush administration. (Ahmadinejad 2009: 
unpaginated) In response to this blackmail by way of over-identifying with liberal ideology, the 
Left should remember that this attempt to return to a primordial, ‘authentic’ community already 
signifies the exposure of Iran to whatever modernity is. “It is a reaction to the universal 
dimension of the world market – as such, it occurs on its terrain, against its background. For that 
reason, what we are dealing with in these phenomena is not a ‘regression’ but rather the form of 
appearance of its exact opposite: a kind of ‘negation of negation,’ this very reassertion of 
‘primordial’ identification signals that the loss of organic-substantial unity is fully consummated.” 
(Žižek, 2006: 169) Thus the threat to be avoided is that of placing Iran within a pre-modern field 
where the Iranian regime cannot be judged by the West. As has been seen, such a fantasy 
betrays a more insidious form of patronizing Eurocentric distance while also preventing any 
response to or judgment regarding Iran, thereby turning the depoliticizing nature of 
multiculturalism against the Western Left. 
What’s more, and perhaps most importantly, such a perspective is simply wrong. Jalal 
Al-Ahmad’s Plagued by the West, one of the first and still one of the most influential 
commentaries on the use of militant Islam, obviously operated as a response to the West. 
Al-Ahmad saw Islam as the only remaining barrier to Western capitalism and 
rampant consumerism. Plagued by the West blended a Nietzschean critique of 
modern technology with a Marxian one of alienated labor, also attacking the 
cultural hegemony of the West. The text was peppered with references to Albert 
Camus, Eugene Ionesco, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Franz Kafka. (Afary and 
Anderson, 2005: 59)
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Another excellent example of a direct engagement with the modern condition on the part of 
Iranian ideologues can be seen in Ali Shariati, “one of the most influential Muslim thinkers of his 
generation… Shiriati’s reinterpretation of jihad and martyrdom was influenced by his 
philosophical studies in France, though he also claimed to present an ‘authentic Islam.’” (Ibid) 
“Shariati introduced an existentialist reading of the Karbala narrative that was also informed by 
Heidegger’s work. He elevated the concept of martyrdom above all else and called it the 
defining moment of Shi’ism.” (Ibid: 60)
In light of the literature which is circulating amongst the Iranian Left, the notion of a pre-
modern Iran becomes even more ridiculous. In an interview with Danny Postel, Iranian 
intellectual Ramin Jahanbegloo described the Iranian Left as concerned with the texts of 
Habermas and Kant, as well as Arendt and Marx. (Postel, 2006: 82-6) Jahanbegloo even points 
out a “group of young intellectuals who seem to be very much influenced by the works of 
Derrida, Foucault, Agamben, Badiou, and Žižek.” (Ibid: 90)
The first consequence of mitigating this supposedly irreducible gap between Iran and 
modernity is the opening of the possibility of solidarity between the Iranian and Western Left. 
This dialogical engagement between intellectuals and ideologues is not only inevitable, it is also 
definitively modern, as “modernity is fundamentally about the reflexive making of history, and in 
this process the struggle for mutual recognition occupies the most important place.” (Ibid: 96) 
The second consequence of mitigating this gap is the ability of the Left to reconsider the topic of 
Iran without being blackmailed by the depoliticizing multicultural distance which prevents 
judgment. As a result, instead of the Left experiencing Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric as ‘taking the 
words out of their mouths’ and leaving them speechless, the Western Left should over-identify 
with Ahmadinejad’s over-identification, tightly tying him to the letter of his overtly shallow and 
cynical ideological paradigm. The “raw anti-colonial message that barely disguises its quest for 
Iranian domination in the Middle East,” must be revealed to be an imperialist exporting of 
militant Islam carried out by guerilla organizations which receive support from Iran. (Baer, 2008: 
43) Any and all references to ‘inalienable nuclear rights’ should be met with inquiries into the 
status of the inalienable rights of the individuals who function as foundational support for the 
current Iranian regime and supplemented with a refusal by Leftists to be blackmailed by their 
conservative counterparts as expressed in the acknowledgement that there is no ‘inalienable 
right’ to nuclear weapons or power. Also of critical importance is that the West attempt to 
undermine Ahmadinejad’s (paranoid) fantasy support as determined by the Other of foreign 
plots. To this end, attempts should be made to connect directly with the Iranian Left, as well as 
the Iranian people more generally. Furthermore, some willingness to make concessions should 
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be considered as a mechanism to oblige the current regime to explain why Iran experiences 
international isolation. 
One of the easiest ways to traverse the fantasy space of a given ideology’s conception 
of the Other is to notice how this Other is at once incapable of stealing the object-cause of 
desire – which can only be accessed by the ideology in question, of course – and to notice how 
this Other simultaneously always threatens to take this object from us. A prime example of this 
logic can be seen in the concern over immigration in the United States, where foreigners are at 
once over-productive, hard-working to the point of threatening all job security, and overly-lazy, 
to the point of functioning as parasites on the social body who contribute nothing back to it. 
Similarly, Iran can be said to function along the same axis if we replace the object with 
modernity itself: Iran seems incapable of entering into the sphere of modernity, as any multi-
culturalist will be sure to emphasize, and yet, as any conservative will claim, in light of Iran’s 
control over such a huge percent of the world’s oil supply, as well as their refusal to engage in 
secular politics and attempts to develop nuclear technology, Iran threatens to disintegrate 
modernity itself. Both of these alternatives should be rejected as falling prey to the same 
fantastic projection to be avoided. Instead, the Left should simply advocate dialogue with Iran in 
the broadest sense, acknowledging this (inevitable) dialogical exchange as being constitutive of 
the modern condition while also being weary of the way in which Leftist refusal to address Iran 
only leaves a culpable void to be filled by more conservative ideologies which, in turn, feed 
Ahmadinejad’s paranoid ideology of anti-imperialism. 
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